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It is a great honor and privilege to contribute to this Festschrift dedicated to the work 
of Professor Guy Haarscher.  The timing of this celebration could not be better.  We live in 
perilous times for deliberative democracies, and Guy has been one of the most important 
voices discussing rhetoric in contemporary political and legal spheres.  On the other hand, 
the human race has always lived in perilous times.  As we address contemporary perils, we 
confront the realization, yet again, that there are no fixed truths upon which we might anchor 
society.  As our technical manipulation of nature and our conceptual powers reach heights 
that were unimaginable just a generation ago, we are fated to recall – with humility – that it 
is only in the realm of discourse about the probable that w e sustain human society. There is 
no safety net to protect us, and yet we require prudential guidance.  Reflecting on the w ork 
of Guy Haarscher is responsive to this vital need. 
 
 
The title of my chapter has multiple meanings, and I unfold my thesis in the interstices 
of these meanings.  I discuss “right rhetoric,” but I use this term in a deliberately confused 
manner.  On one hand, I mean rhetoric that is done correctly – or, righteous rhetoric.  This 
meaning can be opposed to the traditional epithet that one is engaged in “mere rhetoric,” by 
which the critic usually means sophistry and trickery.  But there is another sense of “right 
rhetoric,” suggesting the rhetoric employed by those on the political right. The phrase “right 
rhetoric” contains within itself a conundrum: how can we judge the rhetoric of the political 
right without having a timeless standard of right rhetoric? 
 
 
The subtitle, “What Lawyers M ay Learn from the Study of Rhetoric,” is a play on the 
title of Chaïm Perelman’s essay, “W hat the Philosopher M ay Learn from the Study of Law.”1 
Perelman famously argues that philosophers should not posit math or natural science as their 
model, but instead should look to legal practice and its practical attention  to  concrete 
 
 
 
 
1 C haïm P erelman, “W hat the P hilosop her M ay Learn from the Study of Law,” (S. R ubin trans.) in Justice, 
Law and Argum ent: Essays on M oral and Legal Reasoning (D ordrecht, H olland : D . R eidel P ublishing C o., 19 80). 
  
problems that cannot be resolved by applying an algorithm.  Legal practice is a continuing 
practical adjustment of guiding norms to meet the need for a decision that must be rendered 
on imperfect information and in cases where more than one reasonable argument may be 
made.2 W e must admire the w isdom in Perelman’s conclusion that modeling philosophy on 
law “would permit better understanding of the specificity of philosophy, a discipline which 
is elaborated under the aegis of reason, but a reason which is essentially practical, turned 
toward rational decision and action.”3 But is it not equally the case that the pragmatic 
engagements of the lawyer call for the refinement and perspective that might be offered by 
the philosopher of rhetoric?  I wish to emphasize that this is one of the important roles that 
Guy Haarscher has played during his fruitful career. 
 
 
I. The Dilemma of Right Rhetoric 
 
 
In the W est we face the dilemma of “right rhetoric.”  Regressive forces w ho seek to 
limit dialogue and narrow the participation of those engaged in the dialogue pose a disturbing 
challenge to our increasingly globalized, multi-cultural societies.  If the provincialism and 
anti-intellectualism of the right were to prevail we would be threatened with the prospect of 
a society grounded in contention and violence, as those who are silenced and excluded from 
avenues of peaceful participation respond to the repressive violence with violence of their 
own. This is a dilemma, and not simply a political problem, because it is difficult to see how 
we can confront the rhetoricians of the right, unless we are able to offer an account of how 
one may engage in proper rhetoric.  The dilemma is whether we can combat the rhetoric of 
the right without a theory of righteous rhetoric, given that it is the notion of a righteous 
rhetoric that appears to be the very problem with the rhetoric of the right. Haarscher provides 
an important contribution to our civic discourse by tackling this precise question. 
 
 
Haarscher advances this endeavor in an article that diagnoses the pseudo-arguments 
used by religious fundamentalists to promote the ideology of creationism.4 The problem 
 
 
 
2 P erelman writes: 
It is when the subject matter escap es the qualification of true or false, because it do es not depend 
upon a unitary science but upon a philosophical pluralism, that an attitude of tolerance is justified 
and that a dialogue, permitting the perspectives to be enlarged, is not only useful but even 
indispensable.  Just as the judge, before making a decision, should hear two sides . . . the adoption 
of a philosophical positions, at the risk of lacking rationality, should take into account the op po sed 
points of view co ncerning the subject matter. 
Ibid. at 172-73. 
 
3 Ibid. at 174. 
 
4 G uy H aarscher, “Perelman’s Pseudo-Argument as Applied to the Creationist Controversy,” Argumentation 
23:3 (2 009), pp. 361-73.  H aarscher carefully no tes the technical meaning of “pseudo-argument” in P erelman’s 
terminology.  It does not refer only to hypocritical arguments, but to any argument in which the rhetor does not 
emb race the values that serve as the starting point.  For examp le, one might believe that a course of action is proper 
but choose to invoke religious gro unds for m otivating a believer to agree to the course of action, even if one is 
  
identified by Haarscher is the rhetorical “wolf in sheep’s clothing” that occurs when 
fundamentalist Christians use the liberal language of tolerance in an effort to introduce 
religious beliefs into the public school curriculum.  He analyzes the situation from the 
perspective of a philosopher of rhetoric, noting the evolving patterns that the fundamentalists 
employed in their efforts to require religious education in public schools.  His account 
provides an overview that brings together various points in time and situations to paint a 
picture of the abuse of rhetoric. 
 
 
He begins his story with the famous Scopes trial, in which the progressive lawyer 
William Jennings Bryan directly and unapologetically argued that fundamentalist Christianity 
has a place in public education in order to ennoble society. Bryan was proved to be ignorant 
of scientific doctrine in a cartoonish stunt posed by defense attorney Clarence Darrow, but 
the trial court found Scopes guilty because he had blatantly and purposefully violated the 
law. The Supreme Court had not yet developed the doctrine under the First Amendment that 
religious dogma has no place in the science classrooms of public schools.   In this 
environment, the advocates of a religious worldview competed directly with the secularists 
in the legislatures and courts, contending for the right to shape the contours of the society. 
On one side were religious believers, who rejected the chutzpah of modernity and sought a 
traditionalist society; on the other side were scientific secularists, who sought to relegate 
religious belief to the private sphere and to ground the organization of society on liberal 
democratic principles. 
 
 
Haarscher contends that the obvious need for rigorous scientific education after the 
threat posed by the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union forced the fundamentalist 
Christian movement to use alternative strategies of persuasion in their effort to shape social 
mores according to religious doctrine. After the United States Supreme Court declared that 
an Arkansas statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution violated the Establishment Clause,5 
the fundamentalists no longer could promote their religious agenda directly.  The debate 
became less open and honest, and as a result the debate became more dangerous.  The 
fundamentalists altered their strategy to include rhetorical invocations of the desirability of 
open debate, the need for freedom in research and thinking, the acceptance of plural 
worldviews, and other disingenuous claims to advance their religious agenda. In the face of 
challenge, they changed their strategy to an indirect claim that the rights of believers must 
be given equal credence in the public sphere. 
 
 
I will not recount Haarscher’s detailed and complex analysis, and will just affirm my 
agreement with his conclusion that we should “not concentrate all our energies on the frontal 
attack” by enemies of liberalism, but instead that it is important for us to acknowledge that 
 
 
 
agno stic as to tho se b eliefs. 
 
5  E p p erso n v. A rkansas, 39 3 U .S. 97 (19 68). 
 “indirect attacks, that is, the “w olf in the sheepfold” strategy, can perhaps be still more 
damaging to the very fabric of liberal-democratic values.”6 I wish to strengthen this claim 
by emphasizing that Haarscher seeks to expose “right rhetoric” by offering a model of “right 
rhetoric.”  It is sophistry to argue that every form of argument is equally valid at every point 
for every cause.  Rhetoric cannot be scripted in advance to ensure a specific result – such a 
view is antithetical to the heart of discourse – but nevertheless there is an integrity to 
argumentation that makes some arguments appropriate and others inappropriate. Haarscher 
provides an example of how we can reveal a lack of integrity in a specific instance of 
democratic argumentation without having to resort to the claim that there is only one correct 
answer to the social problem that can therefore be implemented and enforced without debate. 
 
 
In other words, “right rhetoric” is not an invariable standard that we can derive from 
looking only to the results of discourse – this would be the sophistic mistake of conflating 
“right rhetoric” with reaching the “right answer.”  Instead, we can regard “right rhetoric” as 
a standard of how one argues, paying attention to logos, ethos and pathos.  In any given 
situation, there may be many arguments that are logically appropriate, but many of these 
arguments will fail to have integrity because they do not evidence the ethos of the rhetor as 
a person seeking an understanding of the subject matter in question. This is the nature of the 
threat posed by pseudo-arguments: the rhetor does not embrace the starting points of the 
argument, and so ethos is radically diminished, meaning that the argument is on shaky 
ground from the beginning.  Nevertheless, even a pseudo-argument might make perfect 
logical sense, but the problem is that it can betray a lack of ethical commitment by the 
speaker that is manifested by an effort to manipulate, rather than to persuade, the audience.7 
 
 
This is the same problem that Haarscher addresses in an essay that challenges leftist 
thinkers to abandon their “politically correct” forgiveness for positions taken by some 
M uslim activists, solely in the interest of expressing solidarity with an oppressed people.8 
He recalls the situation in the last century when left intellectuals apologized for the tyranny 
in Soviet Russia and China out of a misplaced sense that to criticize these socialist regimes 
would be to weaken the effort to overcome capitalism. He again identifies a rhetorical basis 
for this criticism, exploring how the rhetorical device of “poisoning the source” is used to 
subvert a genuine rhetorical engagement.  W hereas the critics of communist tyrants were 
 
 
6 “Perelman’s pseudo-argument” at p. 372. 
 
7 I agree with Haarscher (and his reading of Perelman) that pseudo-arguments may have integrity in some 
situations.  For example, I would regard it as appropriate to seek to persuade a religious believer that stewardship of 
G od’s creation required us to attend to the threat of global warming, even though I do not share the premises of 
belief to which I would anchor my argument.  T his strategy need not be manipulative or deceptive, but could be an 
open translation of one ethical system to another in an effort to find a basis for shared commitment from a variety of 
sources. 
 
8 See G uy H aarscher, “T he D ecline of Free T hinking” in Resolving International Co nflicts: Liber 
A mico rum T ibor V árady 11 9 (Peter H ay, et. al., eds.) (C E U P ress, 20 09). 
 labeled “fascist reactionaries,” the defenders of free dialogue about the M uslim religion are 
branded “Islamophobe racists.”  Such an ad hominem rhetorical framing of the issue serves 
to cut off genuine discussion of the issues on the merits, reinforcing the sophistic goals of 
the left in supporting certain persons and causes. 
 
 
In both of these recent articles Haarscher has spoken clearly to the question of how 
to provide the standard by which to criticize the rhetoric of the right.  In yet another article 
on the abuses of the forms of liberal discourse by its opponents, Haarscher recognizes the 
problem in clear terms: 
 
 
It is here that, it seems to me, a fundamental question must be 
raised, which concerns both Vico and Perelman.  How can we 
make a meaningful difference between “good” rhetoric and a 
confused, irrational discourse, full of parologisms, that is, 
involuntary errors of reasoning, or –  w orse – a deliberately 
manipulated speech (sophistry)?9 
 
 
The answ er he offers is that we must attend to the integrity of arguments; we must take 
arguments seriously and recognize that they have an internal structure that must align with 
the speaker’s ethos. By attending to this integrity, Haarscher shows that we can identify and 
critique the sophistry of those on the right who deploy the rhetoric of liberal democracy 
against its own tenets, as well as the sophistry of the left who shield their favored persons 
from challenge and critique. 
 
 
II.  Haarscher and the Lessons of Rhetorical Philosophy 
 
 
I believe that the foregoing demonstrates that the philosopher of rhetoric has much to 
teach the practitioners of rhetoric in the political and legal spheres. This is not to suggest that 
we can provide a philosophical model that will generate the right results in particular cases. 
Perelman’s incisive point remains equally important today: the practical engagement of the 
jurist in a particular case reveals how moral reasoning works, and the philosopher is 
incompetent to  provide  a  roadmap  to  a  person  w ho  is  confronting  an  ethical or legal 
dilemma.  Nevertheless, it remains true that philosophical reflection on the activity of 
rhetorical engagement can generate critical insight that facilitates practical judgment. 
 
 
It is useful to recall Hans-Georg Gadamer’s “praise of theory,” despite having spent 
a career emphasizing the irreducibly practical nature of understanding and critique. Gadamer 
insists that he does not discount the importance of theory, and he emphasizes that his defense 
of hermeneutical engagement is theoretical, just as Aristotle’s defense of ethical engagement 
 
 
 
9 “Rhetoric and It’s Abuses” at p. 1229. 
in the Nicom achean Ethics is theoretical.10  Gadamer builds a theoretical argument that leads  
 
him to conclude that practical engagement is necessary, but that also guides his 
understanding of the manner in which practical engagement should take place in order to be 
most  productive.    From  Gadamer’s  pathbreaking  work  in  hermeneutics  w e  can  learn 
something important about the role of theoretical reflection on the art of rhetoric, even if the 
role is more circumscribed than we academics might hope. 
 
 
W hereas Perelman challenged moral philosophers to look to the world of action (the 
world of argumentation, practical reasoning and judgment by judges in law cases), we can 
conceive of Haarscher as pulling in the opposite direction, asking law yers and civic officials 
to consider what they might learn from a philosophical approach to rhetorical discourses. 
But, if there is no overriding directive theory that we can provide to actors, no methodology 
to generate the correct results in given cases, w hat is the lesson to be learned?  Haarscher’s 
project is to carefully reveal the rhetorical moves that undermine democratic discourse and 
sidetrack practical reasoning. He does not attempt a theoretical short-circuit that eliminates 
the need for practical discourse to take place; rather, he illuminates how the intertwined 
discourses that are necessary for the building and maintenance of society might be 
augmented and protected from abusive tactics. 
 
 
W e  can  return  to  Haarscher’s  analysis  of  the  shifting  strategies  of  religious 
fundamentalists as part of their effort to introduce the teaching of creationism in the public 
schools.  He concludes that these indirect rhetorical ploys can be exposed by careful 
rhetorical analysis, but he also notes that in each instance the court ruled against the 
creationists. W e might ask whether his example undermines his case. Does this suggest that 
the philosopher of rhetoric is, in fact, unnecessary; that the law courts are able to reason their 
way to the correct conclusion without the assistance of contemporary rhetorical theory?  I 
want to suggest just the opposite.  The court reaches the correct result in these cases by 
seeing through the justificatory rhetoric to the motivations of the creationists, but the courts 
do not analyze (and most likely, do not understand) how these improper motivations are 
executed. This leaves room for error, because courts may not always appreciate the driving 
force of the arguments that are proffered. Haarscher notes this problem with regard to a case 
before the European Court of Human Rights, which accepted the translation of the religious 
claim against blasphemous speech into a right of believers not to have their beliefs 
gratuitously offended.  Here, the rhetorical claims of the religious right are accepted as a 
“wolf in sheep’s clothing,” despite employing the same rhetorical move that has failed in the 
United States when the motivations are more obvious.11  In short, by drawing more attention 
to the ways in which rhetoric is deployed, philosophers can help to keep courts from falling 
 
 
 
10 H ans-G eo rg G ad am er, “P raise of T heo ry” in P raise of Theory: Speeches and E ssays 16-23 (C hris 
D awson trans.) (N ew H aven: Y ale U niversity P ress, 19 99). 
 
11 H aarscher, “Rhetoric and Its Abuses,” at pp. 1246-1250. 
victim to sophistic persuasion in situations where the ethos of the claimants is not patently  
 
deficient. 
 
 
I want to push – and, perhaps, to some extent beyond – Haarscher’s analysis in order 
to deepen his point that a direct rhetorical confrontation is desirable. Discussing the famous 
Scopes trial, Haarscher describes it as an honest confrontation between religious ideology 
and liberal principles of free speech that predated the later rhetorical abuses by creationists. 
Unfortunately, his analysis suggests that when the arguments are accurately presented the 
winner is virtually preordained according to our modern conceptions of freedom and 
democracy. Indeed, it was the perceived futility of making direct arguments after the United 
States Supreme Court adopted the modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence that 
presumably motivated the creationists to mount a series of unsuccessful pseudo-arguments. 
 
 
I want to revisit Haarscher’s example of the direct clash between William Jennings 
Bryan and Clarence Darrow during the Scopes trial to underscore that a genuine rhetorical 
exchange can be the source of a rich dialogue that can undermine ideological commitment 
on both sides of an argument.  Bryan was a famous populist politician and ardent defender 
of the rights of the common person.  W e might blame his defense of the school district on 
the grounds of fundamentalist Protestant beliefs, but we find a much more interesting story 
through a closer examination.  Bryan can be criticized for seeking to impose religious 
worldviews through public education, but the evolutionists of the day cannot be absolved of 
responsibility for the reprehensible ideology manifested by some of their members.  W hen 
the rhetorical clash was direct and genuine, the clash between Christianity and evolutionary 
science produces a far more nuanced picture than we assume. 
 
 
Bryan argued against the teaching of evolution not only to secure the primacy of the 
biblical story of creation, but also to combat the racist uses to which the “science” of 
evolution  was  put  in  Europe  and  the  U nited  States.12  Scopes was convicted for using a 
textbook that described Darwin’s and M endel’s work to support the practice of eugenics as 
a natural consequence of taking a “scientific” view .13  
begins with unapologetically racist premises: 
The analysis in the high school text 
 
 
The Races of M an.  At the present time there exist upon the earth five races 
or varieties of man, each very different from the other in instincts, social 
customs, and, to an extent, in structure. [He then describes the Ethiopian 
(N egro), M alay (brown), A merican Indian, and M ongolian (yellow) races] . . 
 
 
12 T he mo tivations for B ryan’s crusade against evolution late in his life are described in his biography.  See 
P aolo E . Coletta, W illiam Jennings Bryan (V ol. 3, ch. 8: “T he A ntievo lution C rusad e”) (U niversity of N eb raska 
P ress, 1964). 
 
13 T he textbook is G eorge W illiam H unter, A C ivic B iology: P resented in P roblems (New York, NY: 
A merican B ook C ompany, 1914).  It is availab le in full text at  http ://b o o ks.goo gle.com /b o o ks. 
. and  finally, the  highest type  of  all, the  Caucasians,  represented  by the  
 
civilized white inhabitants of Europe and America.14  
 
 
After linking Darwin’s theory of evolution to his observation of the successful breeding of 
animals, the text emphasizes the responsibility of persons to breed well and the relevance of 
eugenics to the modern social order.15  Having demonstrated the results of “feeble-minded” 
persons having similarly impaired descendants, the text proposes the following “remedy” that 
could lead to a better society: 
 
 
If such people w ere lower animals, we would probably kill them off to keep 
from spreading.  Humanity will not allow this, but we do have the remedy of 
separating the sexes in asylums or other places and in various ways preventing 
intermarriage and the possibilities of perpetuating such a low and degenerate 
race. Remedies of this sort have been tried successfully in Europe and are now 
meeting with success in this country.16  
 
 
Bryan was specifically aware of the “scientific” eugenics movement in Germany, an ideology 
that helped to fuel the chaos of W orld W ar I and that came to fruition a generation later in 
the horrifically warped expressions of Nazi ideology. 
 
 
When the wolf is not in sheep’s clothing promoting the ideology of free dialogue, we 
might find that Christianity has a lesson to teach the proponents of evolution. Clothed in the 
rhetorical mantel of scientific truth, the blatantly political and ideological extensions of basic 
evolutionary science escape a genuine and challenging dialogue.  This is precisely the 
dialogue that Bryan – champion of the common man, defender of the individual against the 
power of the elites – wished to initiate in the trial, as he offered the Christian notion of the 
sanctity of each person against the incipient fascist eugenics of the day. 
 
 
The point is not to reverse the order of priority and to present Bryan as the virtuous 
person in the debate.  Certainly, the principles of free speech and the arguments against the 
dogmatic inculcation of public school students with the religion of the majority were nobly 
advanced by Clarence Darrow, himself a crusader against injustice.  M oreover, Bryan was 
linked to the Ku Klux Klan during his political career – not as an active or even sympathetic 
supporter, but because he was too ready to tolerate their beliefs as representatives of common 
men.  Ironically, he was flirting with a Christian version of the very racist eugenics that he 
found deplorable in the scientific evolutionary theory of his day. The point to be taken away 
 
 
 
14 Ibid. at p. 196. 
 
15 Ibid. at pp. 253-61. 
 
16 Ibid. at 263. 
  
from the Scopes trial is that the issues were richly presented, before the creationists went 
underground and pursued pseudo-arguments, and before the defenders of secularism adopted 
an ad hominem attack on believers that rejected out of hand any arguments flowing from 
Christian belief. 
 
 
The philosopher of rhetoric, exemplified by Haarscher, can remind us of the structural 
blindness on both sides of a public argument if they both resort to the sophistic pursuit of 
victory without attending to the integrity of the debate. Haarscher has demonstrated that our 
modern conceptions of secular democracy are imperilled when creationists adopt pseudo- 
arguments that do not engage the issues openly on their merits. W e should not conclude that 
those motivated by Christian faith are to be ignored, though, because the rhetoric of scientific 
truth is also used to shield ideological commitments from genuine debate. The philosopher 
of rhetoric can show how the debates become derailed, which is not the same as providing 
the answer to the debates but is far better than a quiescent resignation that the practices of 
argumentation lie beyond the reach of theoretical critique. 
